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valuations but costly signals about the latter, Cooper and Fang (2008) also report evidence consistent with the spite hypothesis. If spite, or any form of distributional preferences, is causal for non-sincere bidding in the VA, then deviations of bids from true valuations per construction should be absent in the BDM mechanism (Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak, 1964) -which, under standard assumptions, is strategically equivalent to the VA. Intuitively, in the BDM, the decision is made in isolation and the outcome has only consequences for the decision maker, whereas in the VA, the outcome is also affected by the behaviour of a rivalling bidder, and by changing the own bid, a subject influences the monetary outcome for both parties involved. To test the impact of distributional preferences on bidding behaviour in the lab, we first elicit the distributional preferences of subjects and then let them bid for lottery tickets either in a BDM or in a VA. We then compare the bids across the two mechanisms. We observe underbidding in the aggregate in the VA, but the experimental data do not confirm our predictions at the individual level.
Our contribution to the existing literature is two-fold. First, by keeping all details except for the treatment variation constant across treatments, our experimental design allows for a neat comparison of BDM and VA bids at the aggregate level; and secondly, by classifying subjects into distributional preference types and comparing their bidding behaviour across mechanisms, our design allows for a clean test of the hypotheses that distributional preferences are causal for a potential treatment difference.
1 Keeping the number of bidders constant across the two mechanisms seems indispensable as the probability that a bidder becomes pivotal decreases in the number of rivals and because with a higher probability of pivotality, we expect bidders to perform higher cognitive effort as their actions are more likely to influence the final monetary payoff distribution. 2 Keeping instructions comparable across treatments also seems important because framing effects are known to potentially influence the behaviour in the lab (see, e.g., Levin et al., 1998).
Experimental setup and theoretical predictions
The experiment consists of two treatments -the BDM treatment and the VA treatment -implemented in a between-subject design and paid under random lottery incentives.
Each treatment consists of two parts, and subjects know that only one part is payoffrelevant: 3 1. In part 1, we elicit the distributional preferences of subjects with the Equality Equivalence Test (EET) by Kerschbamer (2015) and then we expose them to an incentivised survey.
2. In part 2, a lottery ticket (giving either w = 12 EUR or 0 EUR with equal probabilities) is auctioned off under either the BDM or the VA. Subjects' initial endowment in part 2 is e = 12 EUR.
4
EET : This procedure exposes each subject to a number (in our case 10) choices between two allocations each specifying a payoff for the subject and a payoff for a randomly assigned anonymous second subject. In half of the choices, there is advantageous inequality (the deciding subject is ahead in monetary terms), in the other half there is disadvantageous inequality (the deciding subject is behind in monetary terms).
From the choices of the subject x-and y-scores measuring the benevolence in the two domains of inequality are calculated. A higher x-score (y-score) means more benevolence in the domain of disadvantageous (advantageous) inequality. These scores jointly determine the distributional type of the subject. VA: In the VA subjects are randomly assigned to pairs. In each pair, the subjects - From Proposition 1 and the fact that selfish and altruistic subjects combined comprise the majority in experimental data (see, e.g., Kerschbamer, 2015), we derive:
Theoretical Prediction 1. Comparing bids across treatments, (i) selfish subjects will not change their bids, while altruistic (spiteful) types will underbid (overbid) in VA relative to the BDM;
(ii) in the aggregate, we expect underbidding in the VA relative to the BDM.
Results
We conducted all sessions in paper-and-pen at the University of Innsbruck in October and November 2013 and collected n = 320 observations -146 in the BDM and 174 in the VA. We classify subjects as We observe a difference in aggregate bidding behaviour, which is significant at the 10% level. Given the relatively large share of altruists in the population, one might be tempted to see the predictions of Proposition 1 confirmed. We cannot reconcile the aggregate treatment difference with data at the individual level, though. For both selfish and spiteful types, we observe a significant (at the 10% level) change in bids, 5 Scores between -0.5 and +0.5 are compatible with selfishness and other types. We classify subjects as selfish whenever they are potentially selfish resulting in "double-counting" several observations. 6 We only include those types for which a prediction as embodied in Proposition 1 exists. 5 while for altruists there is no significant difference. This contradicts our theoretical predictions.
Conclusion
Our experimental design allows for a genuine comparison of BDM and VA, both at the aggregate level and at the level of the distributional type. While we observe a behavioural difference between the two mechanisms at the aggregate level, the difference cannot be explained by a purely consequentialist utility function of the form u i (x i , x j ) = f (x i ) ± g(x j ). Such functions seem to be well-suited to explain behaviour in simple decision problems like dictator games, but less suited to explain behaviour in market environments such as the VA.
